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Introduction

he historic December 2008 European Council meeting in
Brussels resulted inter alia in the endorsement by European Union (“EU”) leaders of a plan to revive the Lisbon Treaty, following the treaty’s rejection by the Irish people
in June 2008. Both the 2005 European Constitution and its successor, the 2007 Lisbon or Reform Treaty,1 are aimed at improving lingering shortcomings in the
institutional operation of the EU
in a number of policy fields.2 To
this end, the EU’s Member States
had decided inter alia to appoint
a full-time European Council
President,3 promote a clearer and
fairer voting system in the Council of Ministers,4 create a more
powerful EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and,5
finally, introduce majority voting
on a number of internal security
policy areas.6
This article focuses exclusively on the extent to which this
new amending treaty will have
an improving effect on the EU’s
performance when negotiating
in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Authors have been unanimous
in identifying the rotating Presidency system, the predominance
of environment ministries in climate change negotiations, and
the complexity of internal EU coordination, as being the three
main causes undermining the negotiating performance of the
EU in international climate talks. Following an analysis of the
climate-related changes instituted by the Reform Treaty, this
article concludes that it will not significantly improve the current
situation, as EU leaders proved largely unwilling to weaken the
powers of the Member States vis-à-vis the Community in that
particular policy area.7

new treaty amended the existing treaties of the EU by carrying
out most of the reforms previously proposed in the rejected European Constitution. The Constitution, signed in October 2004 and
ratified by eighteen Member States, was prevented from entering into force by its rejection in referenda held in France and
the Netherlands in May and June 2005 respectively. The resulting ratification crisis led to a period of “reflection, clarification
and discussion,”8 ending only
when the European summit
held in Brussels in June 2007
abandoned the idea of a European Constitution and decided
to replace it with a new amending treaty in the manner of previous treaties (i.e. the Single
European Act, the Maastricht or
Nice treaties).
Unexpectedly, Ireland—
the only Member State to hold a
referendum—turned its back on
the Lisbon Treaty and voted it
down in June 2008. This unexpected development prompted
the vast majority of journalists9 to prejudge the “death” of
the Lisbon Treaty, followed by
Václav Klaus, the president of the Czech Republic and the only
EU leader to state that “the Lisbon project is finished.”10 However, this pessimism was not shared by other European leaders
who, following the initial shock, initiated negotiations on how to
bypass the Irish problem. As a matter of fact, one of the top priorities of President Nicolas Sarkozy for the French Presidency
of the EU (France took over the six-month rotating presidency
on July 1, 2008) was to come up with a plan for somehow salvaging the Lisbon Treaty.11
The European Council met in Brussels on June 19–20, 2008
and decided to delay any decision until the next summit in October 2008.12 As a result of the unexpected financial meltdown, the
issue of the treaty was pushed to the sidelines, as Europe’s leaders had far more pressing and urgent concerns to occupy their
attention during October’s European Council summit. Decisions

There exist a number
of problems that result
from the EU’s current
institutional set-up,
which involves too many
actors in the whole
climate change
negotiation process.

Background
On December 13, 2007, the heads of government and state
of the EU Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon (also
known as the Reform Treaty) at a summit in Lisbon, Portugal.
Expected at the time to enter into force sometime in 2009, this
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were postponed for the next Council meeting in December 2008,
where European governments eventually approved a package of
concessions to Ireland, aiming at addressing the concerns about
sovereignty that led Irish voters to reject the Lisbon Treaty.13 It
is of interest to note that the EU Presidency had, from the very
outset, the firmly expressed commitment of the Irish government to producing a plan that would facilitate a “Yes” vote in
a future second referendum.14 These concessions were offered
with the proviso that Ireland would ratify the Lisbon Treaty by
October 2009. Of course, it remains to be seen whether these
measures will be enough to convince the Irish people to endorse
the Lisbon Treaty a second time around. In any case, at the time
of writing, the Lisbon Treaty is far from dead and may soon be a
reality in the lives of European citizens. It would therefore be of
usefulness to academics, policy-makers, and all interested parties to be aware in advance of what this treaty actually entails
for Europe.
The main objectives of both the European Constitution and
the Reform Treaty that replaced it were inter alia to establish
simpler and clearer rules for decision-making in a continuously
enlarging EU of (currently) twenty-seven Member States and to
“ensure that the EU’s institutions operate in a more effective and
efficient manner.”15 The present study focuses only on one particular policy area, investigating specifically the extent to which
the new Reform Treaty will ensure a more effective and efficient operation of the EU when negotiating in the context of the
UNFCCC. The relevant EU climate policy literature has long
ago identified a number of problematic features in the EU’s climate decision-making machinery and has offered possible remedies. Groundbreaking as they were, European leaders proved
unwilling to incorporate the bulk of these remedies in the 2007
Lisbon Treaty.

Criticisms of the Current
Institutional Set-Up
Unlike other areas, such as trade, water quality, or hazardous waste disposal, where competence16 lies with the Community, climate change is an area in which a situation of “shared
competence” pertains. In international climate change negotiations, therefore, common EU positions have been agreed upon
in advance “by the Member States, with the participation of the
Commission. The country holding the Presidency of the EU—a
position that rotates every six months—coordinates the members
and presents the EU position at the international negotiations.”17
In other words, the Presidency, assisted by the previous and next
Member State to hold that position (the “troika”), has assumed
the leadership role.
There exist a number of problems that result from the EU’s
current institutional set-up, which involves too many actors in
the whole climate change negotiation process (currently the
twenty-seven Member States plus the Commission). The first
problem is the system of the half-yearly rotating presidency.
Authors argue/criticize that not only does it not allow for continuity in the EU’s negotiating strategy and the formulation of a
long-term strategic perspective, but that it also results in a loss
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of “institutional memory.”18 As Van Schaik and Egenhofer note,
“since the Presidency is changing every half year, there is a relatively high chance of inconsistencies in performance and actual
positions. This semi-annual change in leadership can also be
a constraining factor regarding the formulation of a long-term
strategic perspective.”19
A second complication confronting the EU during the
course of international climate change negotiations is known
as the “EU Bunker.” Changing positions and agreeing on new
proposals by other international actors requires the assent of
the majority of Member States. This, however, is very difficult
to achieve during the course of the negotiations and it can be
a “major source of delay and frustration, with endless co-ordination meetings and the inflexibility of Council Mandates.”20
Investing much (precious) time in bridging internal differences
may also result in EU Member States being practically unable
to react to outside developments. Creatively put, the amount of
time and diplomatic effort that is required for these intra-bloc
negotiations often means that the EU is conducting “a conference within a conference.”21
It is well known, for example, that in the final dramatic
night at Kyoto the EU ministers “were still locked in internal consultations while the plenary was in session: Chairman
Estrada gavelled through the critical text on the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) while EU ministers were still trying
to establish a common position in another room.”22 When they
informed the Chairman of their opposition to the pre-budget
crediting of emission reductions, the decision had already been
made and could not be reopened.23 The same situation recurred
during the sixth Conference of Parties (“COP”) at The Hague in
2000, when EU ministers were still debating amendments they
wished to propose to Chairman Pronk’s compromise paper after
amendments from all the other groups, even the much larger and
under-resourced Group of 77 (underdeveloped countries) plus
China (“G-77/China”), had been circulated and the final night’s
crucial negotiations had begun.24
Finally, a third problem relates to the predominance of
environment ministries and the under-representation of economics and trade ministries in climate change negotiations. Several
authors agree that climate talks have somewhat “outgrown”
the environmental ministries, as they involve not only environmental but also—and increasingly so—economic, trade, development, energy, and transport issues and concerns.25 It is thus
felt that closer cooperation between the environment, trade, and
economic ministries “would do more justice to the economic
realities of climate change policy.”26 In the United States, for
example, it is the State Department that takes the lead in the
negotiations, with the Department of Commerce being responsible for the overall coordination of the U.S. position.27 Following the flawed performance of the EU at The Hague COP in
2000, the EU did try to address this issue by allowing for greater
flexibility in the common position, strengthening the role of the
Committee of Permanent Representatives (“COREPER”), and
having economic, trade, and foreign ministries more involved
in the whole process.28 These changes did lead to improvements
44

in the performance of the EU in COP-6bis (Bonn) and COP-7
(Marrakech), but did not “fundamentally alter the way the EU
position [was] formulated.”29

Suggestions for Improvement
Commentators over the years have made a number of proposals aiming at improving the EU’s operational functioning. It
has been widely suggested, for instance, that the performance
of the EU would improve dramatically if the Member States
allowed the European Commission to take over the coordination of the EU negotiating position from the Presidency.30 This,
however, is a highly unlikely future prospect, as several Member States (i.e. the UK) are vehemently opposed to any further
expansion of the competencies of the Commission.31 As we
shall see, such a prospect becomes even slimmer now with the
new Reform Treaty.
Another proposal, by Lacasta et al., involves delegating
authority to a number of “lead countries” that would prepare,
in close cooperation with the
Commission, “draft common
negotiating positions to be
decided by the Council.”32
Grubb and Gupta share this
proposal, noting in turn that
such a move would “reflect
the nature of the EU as a
strong intergovernmental
rather than supranational
institution.” 33 These “lead
countries”—or the Commission in the first case—would
also be responsible for the
formulation beforehand of
commonly agreed “fallback” positions that would
allow for greater EU flexibility in the decisive phases
of UNFCCC talks.34 Currently, the inflexibility of the
Council mandates results in
the EU having neither such fall-backs nor the necessary mechanisms for coming up with them in the midst of the negotiations.35
However, given the political and economic implications of climate change, the extent to which some Member States would be
willing to allow for decisions to be taken for them without their
express approval and input is subject to debate.
Finally, regarding the issue of the predominance of environment ministries, a possible suggestion by some authors provides
for climate policy to become part of the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy (“CFSP”), thereby bringing “diplomatic
muscle (and, hopefully, finesse) to the Community actions.”36
Similar is one of many proposals by Van Schaik and Egenhofer, who propose that the Foreign Affairs Council would be
responsible for the formulation of climate policy, thus “offering
a possibility for more integration of the EU’s position in climate

negotiations with other external policies of the EU.” 37 In this
case, Environment Ministers, whose expertise is deemed essential, could second their Foreign Ministers during sessions of the
Foreign Affairs Council in which external climate policy negotiating positions are debated.38 Another option in this regard
would be for Foreign and Environment Ministers to hold joint
meetings, for instance every half a year.39

Changes Instituted by the
Reform Treaty
Before attempting to explain the benefits the Reform Treaty
will have for the EU’s performance in UNFCCC negotiations,
a symbolic comment should be made. The new treaty, in the
amended Article 174, states that one of the aims of EU environmental policy will be to promote “measures at [the] international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental
problems, and in particular combating climate change.”40 It is
the first time the term “climate change” appears in the text of an
EU treaty. Provided that it
enters into force, the Reform
Treaty will introduce, as
already discussed, a number of institutional changes
meant to improve the efficient running of the EU.
How then, would this new
treaty strengthen EU performance in international climate change negotiations?
To begin with, the
European Parliament (“EP”)
will be able to veto international agreements, including
climate change-related ones.
Until now, the Council only
consulted the EP and could
ignore its judgement if acting unanimously. Pursuant
to the Reform Treaty, the
consent of the EP (as the
“voice of the people”) would be required for the ratification of
international environmental (including climate) agreements,
enhancing therefore the democratic legitimacy of the EU.41 The
EP might never actually vote down an international environmental agreement, but it may become more demanding and insist
that its viewpoints on climate change issues be taken more seriously into consideration.42
Continuing on with the Presidency, the rotating system will
remain largely the same. Even though the European Council
will have its own President (in office for two and a half years),
the chairmanship of the other councils, except foreign affairs,
will continue to rotate every six months. The efficiency of the
Presidency, however, is expected to improve significantly with
the introduction—already in operation since 2007—of a new
enhanced “troika-like” system, known as the “triple presidency.”

It has been widely suggested
. . . that the performance
of the EU would improve
dramatically if the Member
States allowed the European
Commission to take over
the coordination of the EU
negotiating position from
the Presidency.
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According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
which never came into force, the Presidency would continue to
rotate every six months, but every eighteen months the three
Presidencies due to hold office would negotiate a common
agenda and work together over this one and half year period
to accomplish its objectives, always led by the Member State
holding the presidency at the time. Even though the aforementioned treaty is not legally binding, the September 2006 Council
of the European Union decided to adopt the concept of the presiding trio.43
This development will allow for greater coordination and
continuity, as it will put an end to the practice exercised up to
2006 of every successive Presidency re-writing the agenda every
six months in accordance with its own priorities. In the context of
climate politics, the new “troika-like” system will enable Member States with a greater interest in this policy area to relieve
smaller ones of the burden of conducting negotiations in which
they have no actual interest. As is obvious, not all Member States
are usually active in a particular
policy area. In most Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(“MEAs”), less than half a dozen
positions are likely to emerge,
as most small Member States do
not have a particular line to push.
Luxemburg, for example, cannot
employ more than a handful of
its officials to specialize in any
MEA when it holds the presidency.44 To give another example,
the Presidency during 1996—one
year prior to Kyoto’s crucial
COP-3—had been held by Italy
and Ireland, two countries known
for their lack of a progressive stance on climate change. The
position of the EU had remained practically unchanged since
Berlin’s 1995 COP-1, and it would not have been a hyperbole
to suggest that it had virtually stagnated.45 It is for cases such as
this that the Reform Treaty’s new presiding Trio concept could
prove a far more workable system. Of course, as promising as it
may seem, only time will demonstrate the extent to which this
new arrangement will indeed be an improvement.
A final related innovation is, as already mentioned, the
establishment by the Reform Treaty of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (the High Representative for Foreign Policy and
Security)—merging the existing roles of High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner
for External Affairs. The role, if any, of the High Representative
for Foreign Policy and Security in international climate change
negotiations is as yet unclear.46 According to Van Schaik and
Egenhofer, involvement of the Foreign Minister in EU activities
in the UNFCCC could “advance the integration of climate change
with other policy areas, notably with other external policies.”47
Such involvement, however, even if it does occur, will likely
remain limited or auxiliary, as only officials of environment

ministries command the immensely specialized knowledge on
technical aspects of the climate change policy area.48 Given
that the EU “Foreign Minister” will be mainly responsible for
the EU’s CFSP, Environment Ministers will in all probability
remain largely responsible for the formulation of the EU’s position on climate change, aided on occasion by their economic,
trade, and foreign counterparts. In other words, the current system is not expected to be altered significantly.

Conclusion
To conclude, despite the explicit acknowledgement of climate change in the Reform Treaty, actual climate-related changes
in the Treaty are limited. National governments prove to be adamant in their insistence to maintain control over their energy
policy, a key element of national security in the view of many
sovereigns. When it comes to energy, major disparities exist
within, between, and among the nations of the EU. Given their
vast differences in economic development, these twenty-seven
Member States have, in most
cases, widely different energy
matrices, greenhouse gas emission, and energy consumption
patterns. Internal EU negotiations for agreeing a common climate policy, therefore, are quite
strenuous and time-consuming,
as different Member States are
more willing and/or capable
to reduce their emissions than
others.49 Closely related to this
is the Euro-scepticism of some
Member States (e.g. the United
Kingdom) who are unwilling to
expand the competencies and
reach of the EU’s governing bodies. The Commission’s 1990s
proposal for an energy/carbon tax serving in this case as a prominent example.50
The extent, therefore, to which the new treaty would benefit
the performance of the EU in UNFCCC negotiations is likely
narrow. Contrary to expectations, the Reform Treaty does not
sufficiently address any of the three problems affecting the negotiating ability of the EU tentatively outlined earlier. The “EU
bunker” will continue to afflict the EU, as will most of the problems associated with the predominance of environment ministries. The same largely applies to the rotating Presidency, but in
this case the new enhanced “troika-like” system will definitely
result in some meaningful improvements in the current situation.
Undoubtedly, the big question remains whether the new EU Foreign Minister will become involved in EU climate activities and
what will be his/her exact role. As seen, such an involvement—in
all probability one of limited importance—can only benefit the
EU. In any case, such a discussion is highly hypothetical and the
questions posed will only be answered following the potential
entry into force of the Reform Treaty in 2009 or 2010. Several
authors have advocated a reform of EU institutions as the only

The extent . . . to which
the new treaty would
benefit the performance
of the EU in
UNFCCC negotiations
is likely narrow.
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practical solution for dealing with the current shortcomings of
the EU as a negotiator in policy areas of “shared competence.”
Unfortunately, such a reform of institutions—as far as climate

change policy is concerned—was not carried out by the Reform
Treaty, as it presented a choice not politically acceptable to the
majority of EU Member States.
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